ARCTIC EXERCISE: AFTER ACTION REPORT
ON THE AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION ON MARINE OIL POLLUTION PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE IN THE ARCTIC
SEPTEMBER 2014
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- Assessment of Exercise Design and Conduct
- Key Recommendations

## Acknowledgments

## Appendices  
- Appendix A - Exercise Organization and Participating Agencies
- Appendix B - Process Description
- Appendix C - Summary of Results
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The first exercise under the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic was hosted by Canada, and organised by the Canadian Coast Guard as National Competent Authority for vessel source incidents. It was conducted in concert with the eight signatory nations to the Agreement, Denmark represented in coordination with Greenland and the Faroe Islands, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Russian Federation and the United States of America. Individuals representing the 31 distinct agencies with specific responsibilities under the Agreement were involved in the exercise, executed in real time (simulated date) across all time zones.

A fully functional, divided-event exercise was proposed as a means to address the newness of the Agreement and Operational Guidelines and to further develop familiarity between agencies which may had only limited interaction in the past. The concept provided scheduling flexibility, controlled realism, manageable costs, and importantly allowed for simple application of exercise objectives. A phased approach was designed to represent the first three elements of the Guidelines:

- **Phase 1** Notification of Parties, a fully functional exercise
- **Phase 2** Request for, development and receipt of Offers of Assistance, a fully functional exercise, and,
- **Phase 3** Movement of Resources across borders, conducted as a table top discussion of the requirements to facilitate such movements into Canada.

The scenario involved the grounding of a fictional tanker, transiting the Simpson Strait, south of Gjoa Haven, Nunavut, Canada.

Phases 1 and 2 were conducted and controlled by the Canadian Government Operations Center, (GOC) and Canadian Coast Guard in Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. Phase 1 was conducted on 12th of May, 2014, while Phase 2 was initiated on the 28th and terminated on the 29th of May. The third phase was conducted in Ottawa, Ontario, Canada on the 19th of June, 2014.

**Main results**

**Phase 1: Notification**

A communications systems connectivity test was executed by the Canadian GOC prior to the start of the exercise, resulting in several immediate changes to the original contact information.

There was some variation in terms of preferred methodology for transmitting information as the result of each country’s internal notification/communications processes. However, there was general consensus in maintaining multiple paths of communication, where facsimile would remain the primary method of transmittal of information, followed by e-mail, followed by a phone call. A time allowance between methods of 10-15 minutes was suggested.
EXERCISE: AFTER ACTION REPORT

Phase 2: Request, and Offers of Assistance

While tiered and multiple paths of communication are vital to ensuring communication occurs, the success rate of facsimiles sent and clearly received (4/9 sites) are not considered particularly high as a primary mode of communication. This result suggests that retaining facsimile as the primary mode of communication requires cyclical (every three to six months) testing and validation of the systems in place.

It is recommended that the parties discuss an overall target in the range of 30 minutes per transmission mode. Exhausting all three modes, fax, e-mail and phone/voice should take no longer than 90 minutes to accomplish.

Once received and acknowledged, requests for assistance are subject to internal assessment. The Guidelines recognise that internal assessment processes vary from state to state, and are dependent upon the complexity of the request and availability of personnel on whose authority and knowledge an offer can be created. No recommendations were suggested.

Offers of Assistance were received from participating parties generally within the prescribed formats as indicated by the forms; however in all cases various elements of information as indicated by the Guidelines (sec 2.3) were not included. This suggests that the Offer Communication form be reviewed to provide a closer link between the Guidelines and the proposed form.

Of particular note, one offer of assistance included some private sector assets. This offer, while operationally viable, may be seen as more of a commercial solicitation and potentially better addressed through a contracting protocol.

In terms of time lines, it is difficult to draw any conclusions on what constitutes appropriate periods of time to consider the request. In addition, because of time zone differences and the variability of the national processes in place, it is suggested that at least a 24-48 hour period be allowed for. For time sensitive requests, such as countermeasures that have a narrow window of application, (dispersants, in-situ burning etcetera), it is recommended that those conditions be clearly indicated at the time of the request.

Phase 3: Facilitating the Movement and Removal of Resources across Borders

Overall, the temporary importation of consumable goods, equipment or service personnel during an emergency event can be accomplished without significant delay provided that the lead department coordinates with the Canadian Border Services Agency. It is recommended that each nation reinforces or initiates a similar discussion with their own customs and immigration departments to ensure processes are well known and properly incorporated.

It should be noted that equipment or assets that may contain potential contaminants (biological and chemical) are specifically regulated in Canada and are subject to further clearance requirements, although not strictly customs activities. Similar concerns regarding particular yet commonly available assets should be investigated.
Other Results

As is customary for Exercises, the design, implementation and evaluation process are also subject to review. Of particular note Canada encourages establishing the design process very early in the cycle, and the adoption of the exercising format prevalent in the host country.

The Canadian lead, design and evaluation teams would like to acknowledge and thank all participating individuals and agencies.
Figure 1 – Communications Web, Roles and Responsibilities within the Context of the Agreement
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

The following is a summary of recommendations stemming from the exercise.

Phase 1

1.1 Continue to use multiple modes of communication for notification. The following hierarchy is suggested:
   a) Facsimile would remain the primary method of transmittal of information, followed by;
   b) E-mail, followed by;
   c) A phone call.

1.2 Amend the Sample Form to highlight the purpose of the transmission as this form is designed for both “Notification” and “Requests for Assistance”.

1.3 Amend the contact lists in accordance with the list provided. It should be noted that these changes were implemented prior to conducting both Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the exercise.

1.4 Conduct a review of contact information or a connectivity test annually. This will assist in ensuring that accurate and timely contact information is available. A decision by all parties subject to this agreement, on the cycle and lead for this activity is suggested.

Phase 2

2.1 Conduct connectivity tests of facsimile systems every 3-6 months. It is further recommended that the parties discuss an overall target in the range of 30 minutes per transmission mode. Exhausting all three modes, fax, e-mail, and voice should take no longer than 90 minutes to accomplish.

2.2 Acknowledge that each country’s operations centers and internal notification procedures vary. Some clearly transmitted facsimiles were not acknowledged within 30 minutes or less, however establishing a performance measure based solely on a first exercise is not suggested.

2.3 Amend the Offer Communication form to provide a closer link between it and the Guidelines (sec 2.3).

2.4 Offers of assistance that include private sector assets, while operationally viable, may be seen as more of a commercial solicitation and potentially better addressed through a contracting protocol.
2.5 It was difficult to draw any conclusions on what constitutes appropriate periods of time to consider a request. In addition, because of time zone differences and the variability of the national processes in place, it is suggested that at least a 24-48 hour period be allowed for. For time sensitive requests, such as countermeasures that have a narrow window of application, (dispersants, in-situ burning etcetera), it is recommended that those conditions be clearly indicated at the time of the request.

Phase 3
3.1 The Agreement and Guidelines are not meant to contravene or by-pass national protocols for response activities. In Canada, the Maritime Event Response Protocol, (MERP) must be followed prior to implementing the Agreement. Coordination of various elements of national systems with the Agreement and Guidelines, such as forms, and procedures is encouraged.

3.2 Each Country may consider creating a list of response related situations that require permissions beyond customs and immigration authorities to ensure the proper internal authorities are involved in the process at the earliest stages.

3.3 Increased specificity on the transportation and logistics requirements is required for both “Requests for” and “Offers of” assistance. Significant follow-up and clarification may impede this effort when requests or offers lack information. It is also important to identify any primary point of entry, (land, air or sea).

3.4 A national contact point or liaison should be assigned to assist in the facilitation of the movement of goods and personnel.

Exercise Design and Conduct
4.1 There are a number of different ways in which to design and conduct an exercise; consequently it is recommended that each host nation select and execute whatever methodology they are most comfortable with.

4.2 Each host nation is encouraged to establish the design process and team as early as possible and up to a year or two in advance, to allow for appropriate participation in the process.

4.3 The evaluation feedback was somewhat difficult to coordinate given the requirement to execute this exercise and evaluation remotely and in phases. A more frequent schedule of meetings or preparatory activities is suggested.
POST EXERCISE ACTIVITIES

The following activities and decision points are suggested for further development by the parties and their subject matter experts, National Competent Authorities.

- For signatory parties to adopt a policy of testing the communications linkages (connectivity test) in a cycle of 3 to 6 months, led by the country in which the Arctic Chairmanship resides. Or in the alternative, establish a cycle by which hosts may be identified.

- To facilitate amendments to the Guidelines via subject matter experts or National Competent Authorities.
  a) Convene a discussion on establishing reasonable time lines for transmission and receipt of transmissions.
  b) Convene a workshop (or alternative) to review the forms to better align the information requirements with the proposed formats.

- Encourage all parties to convene their internal agencies to consider the entrance requirements for equipment and personnel as per Phase 3 of this exercise.
OVERVIEW OF EXERCISE
DESIGN, OBJECTIVES AND PARTICIPATION

The Agreement

The Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic was signed on 15 May, 2013 in Kiruna, Sweden. Its serves largely to operationalise the broader International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness Response and Cooperation, of 1990 to which all Arctic States are party. The Agreement contains four Appendices which identify the required contact points and general Operational Guidelines to facilitate its operation.

In recognition of Canada’s Chairmanship of the Arctic Council, 2013-2015, the Canadian Coast Guard undertook to host the first exercise under the auspices of the Agreement.

Exercise Framework

The proposed exercise framework was a function of the newness of the Agreement and Operational Guidelines. This framework is considered particularly effective when parties have not had significant interaction in the past, involves situations that are somewhat unfamiliar, or have not had a chance to fully operationalise new processes.

The proposed style or type of exercise was a “Functional” exercise, where tasks were grouped around a specific aspect of the response. Given this exercise was also the first within the context of the Agreement, the most appropriate starting point required the execution of the initiating or activation type tasks. Subsequent exercises may address the more in-depth operational coordination required.

Canada, acting as Host Nation in collaboration with assigned persons from signatory or participating parties coordinated the overall exercise, any debriefs, evaluations, and final after action report. A project management approach, utilizing the Canadian Coast Guard’s National Marine Spills Response Exercise Program Design and Planning Guide was used in the overall planning, organizing and managing of tasks and resources. Costs for participation were borne by each nation.
Exercise Priorities

The overall organizational objectives of conducting this exercise involved the introduction to a new response procedure and the development familiarity between national competent authorities (in the execution of requests for assistance). The following three priorities were chosen:

- Notification of Parties / Arctic States
- Requests and Offers of Assistance; and
- Movement and Removal of Resources across Borders

Notification of Parties/Arctic States

Section 1 of the Guidelines requires the party in which the incident occurs to initiate a notification of other parties to provide situational awareness to those states whose interests are affected or are likely to be affected. This entails the accumulation of information in a standard format and its conveyance to the other Parties “National 24 hour Operational Contact Points” (Appendix 2 of the Agreement). Acknowledgment from the receiving parties completes this response activity.

Requests and Offers of Assistance

Section 2 of the Guidelines outlines the manner in which requests for assistance are to be framed, acknowledged and replied to. In addition it allows for designation of a Liaison Officer as well as consideration of unsolicited offers of assistance. Parties considering delivering the assistance are required to acknowledge and assess the request in accordance with section 2.3 of the Guidelines. It was recommended that unsolicited offers not form part of the exercise. This entailed the development of a request and the suggested supporting activities in section 2.2 and 2.4 (Liaison Officers) of the Guidelines.

Movement and Removal of Resources across Borders

Section 3 of the Guidelines outlines the processes which should facilitate the movement of personnel and equipment across borders. It was recommended that for the purpose of this exercise that this activity be limited to the identification of customs issues, points of entry, manifesting, immigration and diplomatic clearances from a Canadian point of view.

Degree of Realism

A low degree is realism was suggested given the relative newness of the Agreement and Operational Guidelines. Further, it was not initially clear if each Arctic Nation/Party had communicated or fully integrated the elements of the Agreement into their response plans and processes. This suggested that the exercise be announced, have a limited duration, occur within normal working hours (for the assisting Parties) and have a relatively slow pace.
Exercise Time lines – Divided Event Concept

A divided event exercise limited to the initial stages of an incident was recommended. Further to the advantages identified as part of the framework, additional operational reasons for dividing the event into phases include:

- Provision of scheduling flexibility to coordinate all Arctic States/Parties’ participation
- The control of the degree of realism, and provision of opportunity for coaching.
- The control of the human resources cost, and limitation of play to normal working periods.
- The application of basic steps in the processes via simplification of exercise objectives and inputs.

Consequently, each Response Activity was designed and executed as a distinct phase.

Preliminary Estimate of Exercise Commitments

As host nation with responsibility for management, design, execution and evaluation, the estimated level of commitment was as follows.

Table 1: Commitment Elements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Time required &amp; OPI (estimated)</th>
<th>Contingency/Issues</th>
<th>Target dates (initial)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Design</td>
<td>10 days – Design team</td>
<td></td>
<td>Jan 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation</td>
<td>5 days - Design team</td>
<td></td>
<td>Feb 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Execution/Debrief – Phase 1</td>
<td>3.5 days - Host, 0.5 day per Arctic States/Parties</td>
<td>Scheduling coordination with participants</td>
<td>Apr 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Execution/Debrief – Phase 2</td>
<td>7 days - Host, 1 day per Arctic States/Parties</td>
<td>Scheduling coordination with participants</td>
<td>Apr 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Execution/Debrief – Phase 3</td>
<td>3 days - Host, 1 day per participants</td>
<td>Scheduling coordination with participants</td>
<td>May 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation &amp; Final Report</td>
<td>5 days - Host</td>
<td></td>
<td>May 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presentation to EPPR</td>
<td>2 days - Host</td>
<td></td>
<td>June 2-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Effort - Design and Host</td>
<td>35.5 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>1-1.5 days per</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The exercise activities were scheduled during the typical working “day” for each operational centre. Since phase 1 and 2 activities were initiated by the Canadian Government Operations Centre, operated by Public Safety Canada, significant flexibility was used to minimise impacts to the operations centres of the other Arctic States/Parties, including scheduling of the evaluators/controllers. Each Arctic State/Party was expected to commit and fund their participation.

Exercise Organization and Participation
The exercise organization, planning and evaluation team membership has been included in Appendix A: Exercise Organization and Participating Agencies.

Event Scenario and Relationship to Exercise Priorities
The scenario: Grounding of M/T LUCKY/CFN5555, Simpson Strait East, South of Gjoa Haven, Nunavut, Canada

Figure 2 – General location of incident
Set in early September, a fictional tanker, travelling in the Simpson Strait, a remote centrally located waterway in the Arctic Ocean within Canada goes aground. Initially the incident did not involve any release of pollutants. The initial grounding was used as the basis for the notification of parties, (Phase 1).

Subsequent fictitious but typically applicable actions were presented to facilitate the scenario and provide input for the next phase of the exercise. Phase 2 of the exercise scenario involved a continuous release of Marine Diesel Oil (ISO 8217) at a rate of 2.0 cubic metres per hour. Estimated over the course of approximately 30 days, a trajectory, fate of the product and a series of response challenges (objectives) induced a series of requirements used to create a request for assistance.

Upon receipt of the various offers of assistance, Canadian authorities involved in the movement of goods and personnel undertook a table top discussion, based upon the entry requirements related to elements within those offers. Phase 3 was broadly based, but not necessarily limited to outputs of Phase 2.

**Evaluation**

The evaluation of the exercise was conducted by the assigned national competent authorities or representatives identified as Evaluators/Controllers. As lead, the Canadian Coast acted as the primary author and editor of the report.
RESULTS OF PHASE 1 – NOTIFICATION

Event Review - 12 May, 2014

Phase 1 was initiated at 0800 hrs (Ottawa Time) by the Canadian Government Operations Centre, (GOC).

Prior to transmitting the designed input Form #1, the GOC initiated a connectivity test, whereby a one page Facsimile cover sheet was transmitted to each Operations Center. While this caused some initial confusion it also identified some immediately correctable errors in the Facsimile numbers noted in Appendices of the Agreement.

Upon conclusion of the connectivity test the formal distribution of the notification Form #1 was facilitated. The incident notification was transmitted via the following methods:

a. Fax – a fax was sent to all countries
b. Phone – those countries that could not receive the fax were contacted via phone
c. E-mail – some countries requested the incident information via e-mail

Acknowledgment of the receipt of the notification was generally received within 30 minutes of a successful transmission.

This phase of the Exercise was terminated at approximately 1015 hrs (Ottawa time).

Assessment of Exercise Objectives

Phase 1 – Main Objective

To evaluate the receiving countries integration of the notification procedures, acknowledgement and further notification of internal national competent authorities’ processes or procedures, to the extent outlined in the Guidelines.

Overall Findings

A communications connectivity test uncovered some errors in contact information.

There was some variation in terms of preferred methodology for transmitting information as the result of each country’s internal notification/communications processes.

There was general consensus in maintaining multiple paths of communication, and a time allowance of 10-15 minutes between modes (fax, e-mail and phone).

Finally it was suggested that the Sample Form be amended to highlight the purpose of the transmission as this form is designed for both “Notification” and “Requests for Assistance”.
**Sub-Objectives: Summary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Objectives</th>
<th>Evaluation Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confirmation of initial contact information, and handling of information being received in English (the operational Language of the Guidelines).</td>
<td>Validation of the telephone contacts Validation of receiving ops centres process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification of internal communications procedures for notification of the appropriate national competent authority within each countries process.</td>
<td>Validation of internal distribution to appropriate national competent authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confirmation of the acknowledgement once information has been received.</td>
<td>Validation of acknowledgement procedure.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Detailed findings**

**Confirmation of Initial contact information**

Pre-exercise corrections to Appendix II: National 24 hour Operational Contact Points

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Required Changes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Joint Arctic Command - Greenland</strong></td>
<td>Change <a href="mailto:ako@mil.dk">ako@mil.dk</a> to <a href="mailto:ako-commcen@mil.dk">ako-commcen@mil.dk</a> and <a href="mailto:mrcc-nuuk@mil.dk">mrcc-nuuk@mil.dk</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MRCC Turku, Finland</strong></td>
<td>Change 24 hr telephone from 358 204 1000 to 358 2941001 Change Fax from 358 71 872 0109 to 358 294 1019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maritime Alert Centre, Iceland</strong></td>
<td>Change name to Icelandic Coast Guard / JRCC Change e-mail from <a href="mailto:sar@ihg.is">sar@ihg.is</a> to <a href="mailto:sar@lhg.is">sar@lhg.is</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EXERCISE: 
AFTER ACTION REPORT

Phase 1: Further corrections and validation of pre-exercise contact information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Required Changes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint Arctic Command – MRCC Greenland</td>
<td>Use the <a href="mailto:ako-commcen@mil.dk">ako-commcen@mil.dk</a> e-mail for the exercise instead. The correct fax number to use is 01 299 364099.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRCC Turku, Finland</td>
<td>The preferred telephone number to use for the exercise is the 011 3582941000 number. The preferred fax number to use is 011 3582941019.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime Alert Centre, Iceland</td>
<td>The correct fax number to use is 011 3545452001. The correct e-mail address is <a href="mailto:sar@lhg.is">sar@lhg.is</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Response Centre (NRC), USA</td>
<td>The preferred fax number is 1-202-267-1322. The correct e-mail address is <a href="mailto:nrc@uscg.mil">nrc@uscg.mil</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedish Coast Guard, Sweden</td>
<td>Canadian GOC could not reply to <a href="mailto:lc.krs@coastguard.se">lc.krs@coastguard.se</a> and was directed to use <a href="mailto:lc.krs@kustbevakningen.se">lc.krs@kustbevakningen.se</a>  Note that Appendix II indicates the use of <a href="mailto:vb.krs@coastguard.se">vb.krs@coastguard.se</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOC Canada</td>
<td>Should indicate the country code or a complete international number string i.e. 01 613-991-7000 (24 hr contact point)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: International Calling Procedures require the originating country to dial an exit code, followed by the destination country code, followed by the local telephone or fax number.

Exit Code + Country Code + Local Number

Handling of Information – Use of English as Operating language

A follow-up call was required to clarify the exercise activity as received by the Russian Federation. The GOC (Canada) was able to provide a Russian speaking operator who facilitated the transfer of information. Unfortunately this is cannot be considered a standard operating condition of the GOC.
**Identification of internal communications procedures for notification of the appropriate national competent authority within each country’s process**

Norway, United States, Sweden and Greenland confirmed their internal notification of their National Competent Authorities and other agencies requiring notification as per Appendix I of the Agreement and Section 12 of the Guidelines.

**Confirmation of the acknowledgement once information has been received**

Acknowledgement of receipt of the Notification was transmitted by all parties and received by GOC – Canada generally within 20 minutes of transmission.

**Key Recommendations**

1.1 Continue to use multiple modes of communication for notification. The following hierarchy is suggested:
   a. Facsimile would remain the primary method of transmission of information, followed by;
   b. E-mail, followed by;
   c. A phone call.

1.2 Amend the Sample Form to highlight the purpose of the transmission as this form is designed for both “Notification” and “Requests for Assistance”.

1.3 Amend the contact lists in accordance with the list provided. It should be noted that these changes were implemented prior to conducting both Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the exercise.

1.4 Conduct a review of contact information or a connectivity test annually. This will assist in ensuring that accurate and timely contact information is available. A decision by all parties subject to this agreement, on the cycle and lead for this activity is suggested.
EXERCISE:
AFTER ACTION REPORT

RESULTS OF PHASE 2 –
REQUESTS AND OFFERS OF ASSISTANCE

Event Review - 28 May, 2014

Phase 2 was initiated at 0800 hrs (Ottawa Time) by the Canadian Government Operations Centre, (GOC). Following the protocol established as the result of Phase 1, all parties were notified of Canada’s request for assistance via facsimile of the “Assistance Request Report” as recommended by the Section 11 (Forms) of the Guidelines.

Confirmation of receipt of the initial facsimile transmissions were initially received by only 4 of 9 of the 24/7 operational contact points. Norway, Finland, Faroe Islands, and Iceland did not have any difficulties, while the return facsimile number for the Canadian GOC was unreadable, due to a poor quality printout as received by the United States. Both transmissions to Greenland/Denmark and Sweden, failed. The two contact points within the Russian Federation were unresponsive.

In accordance with the recommendations of Phase 1 of the exercise, the secondary contact protocol (e-mail) was initiated by the GOC (Canada) at approximately 0900 hrs (Ottawa time) for those parties failing to confirm receipt or to which the initial facsimile failed. The United States, Greenland/Denmark and Sweden subsequently received and confirmed receipt of the request for assistance.

During this part of the exercise countries undertook an assessment of their capacity to provide assistance as suggested by the request and in consideration of the limited incident specifics provided. Each party facilitated this process in their own manner and in accordance with their own internal authorities; consequently responses were received at various times, starting at about 1400 hrs culminating in the final offer being received the next morning, 29 May. For the most part a “Response to Request for Assistance” form from each participating party was ultimately received by Canada. It should be noted that these timelines should not be taken as an indicator of the true effort due to the artificiality of the exercise conditions.

Upon receipt of the offers Canada subsequently acknowledged receipt of the response via a “Receipt of Response to Request for Assistance” form. This form indicted that Canada would respond to the offers of assistance upon consideration of all offers, and within 2 days of the artificial exercise timeline.

“Acceptance of Assistance” forms were sent to all participating parties indicating Canada’s willingness to accept the assistance as offered and ultimately to end the exercise. A formal end of exercise facsimile was sent on 29 May to officially terminate Phase 2.

1 Recent organizational changes enacted in the Russian Federation precluded their participation in this phase of the exercise.
Assessment of Exercise Objectives

Phase 2 – Main Objective
To evaluate the receiving countries ability to receive and address a specific request for assistance.

Overall Findings
The process by which a country makes requests, and receives responses for assistance from the other arctic parties requires a particular communications “discipline” to effectively manage the information. The Guidelines were created with that in mind, and suggest a particular order of communications, which have been further reflected in the exercise. A more detailed process description has been included in Appendix B: Process Description.

While it is generally understood that requests and offers should be clear, concise and as detailed as possible, it is worth noting that the templates provide only guidance and a minimum of expected information. Participating Nations should be free to add information as needed.

Request for Assistance and Acknowledgment
A Request for Assistance is generated by the nation in whose waters the incident is occurring or is affecting. In the case of this exercise, Canada as host of the event acted as the initiating or requesting nation. Pre-established inputs based upon the incident scenario were produced and transmitted.

The request was formally transmitted from the host nation, (by its pre-identified 24/7 communications center) to the other pre-identified 24/7 Operations Centers (or equivalent RCC’s) in the prescribed format (Input Form 2: Notification/Assistance Request Report).

While the tiered and multiple paths of communication are vital to ensuring communication occurs, the success rate of facsimiles sent and clearly received (4/9) sites was not considered particularly successful. Considering the non-participation of two Russian Federation centers, the rate of success remains less than 60%. This result suggests that retaining facsimile as the primary mode of communication requires cyclical (every three to six months) testing of the systems in place.

It is recommended that the parties discuss an overall target in the range of 30 minutes per transmission mode. Exhausting all three modes, fax, e-mail and voice should take no longer than 90 minutes to accomplish.
Assessment of Request and Offer of Assistance

Once received by a potential assisting nation, the request is expected to be internally distributed to the National Competent Authority and whatever authority has been assigned the responsibility to provide (or accept as the case may be) assistance. The Agreement identifies these agencies in Appendix II and III respectively. No recommendations are suggested as these processes are considered internal to the state.

After a sufficient period of time, which may vary depending upon the availability of personnel, complexity of the request etc. is allowed for; a potential assisting nation is expected to officially respond to the request. The response should indicate the description and source of assistance in sufficient detail to facilitate an assessment by the requesting nation. The Guidelines propose the use of an “Offer Communication (from Assisting Party to Requesting Party)” form in addition to the information requirements as indicated in the Guidelines (sec 2.3.).

Offers of Assistance were received from participating parties generally within the prescribed formats as indicated by the forms; however in all cases various elements of information as indicated by the Guidelines (sec 2.3) were not included. This suggests that the Offer Communication form be reviewed to provide a closer link between it and the Guidelines (sec 2.3).

Of particular note, one offer of assistance included private sector assets. This offer while operationally viable may be seen as more of a commercial solicitation and potentially better addressed through a contracting protocol.

It was difficult to draw any conclusions on what constitutes appropriate periods of time to consider a request. A further discussion may be warranted, but it is not unreasonable to suggest that at least a 24-48 hour period be allowed for. For time sensitive situations, it was recommended that those issues be clearly indicated at the time of the request.

Summary Tables of the request and offers of assistance is provided in Appendix C: Summary of Results – Request and Offers of Assistance.
Acknowledgements of Receipt of offer of assistance, assessment and decision

The requesting party is then expected to acknowledge receipt of the offer, via a “Receipt Communication (From Requesting Party to Assisting Party)” form indicating the main contact points and when a decision to accept or reject the offer is expected. The request, offer and acceptance process is terminated once the requesting party assesses and makes a final decision on the offer; the guidelines suggest an “Acceptance Communication (From Requesting Party to Assisting Party)” form be used.

As alluded to above, the nation receiving the aforementioned responses is required to assess the various offers of assistance within the context of its initial request. It should be recognised that this may also take a considerable amount of time, (ie. 24 -72 hours), to evaluate or seek clarification, when and if necessary.

Within the context of the exercise, Canada as host acknowledged receipt of all offers (input form 4 – Receipt Communication) indicating that a decision and subsequent response would follow after all other offers were considered.

For expediency, and to inform Phase 3 of the exercise, no detailed assessment was undertaken to validate the type or cumulative impact of assistance offered. Consequently, all requests for assistance were accepted, via Input Form 5 – Acceptance Communication as a means to facilitate the next phase of the exercise.
Sub-Objectives: Summary
Two administrative amendments were made to the detailed sub objectives to capture the interplay between 24/7 Operations centres and the specific forms as outlines in the Guidelines. The amendments did not affect any activity during the exercise and have been included to better describe and report on results. The amendments are indicated in bold, in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Objectives</th>
<th>Evaluation Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Creation and transmission of a request for assistance.</td>
<td>Host country to act as control function.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receipt of request for assistance</td>
<td>Validation of communications process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processing of request through national competent authorities, creation of the offer of assistance and transmission to requesting nation</td>
<td>Validation of each countries internal process for reviewing and responding to a request for assistance. Documentation required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmission of Receipt of response to request for assistance, (Offer)</td>
<td>Validation of the host countries ability to acknowledge receipt of original request.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance of Offers</td>
<td>Host country to act as control function</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Phase 2 Sub-objectives: Detailed findings

Creation and transmission of a request for assistance.
During the design phase of this exercise it was noted that significant coordination and formal communication network is required between the Field Command (National Competent Authority, NCA), National Headquarters – Coast Guard (or other NCA) and National Marine Emergency Plan (Public Safety Canada) coordination to establish the appropriate escalation of resource requests to facilitate this Agreement. This finding may only apply to Canada, but may be considered for review in light of other nation’s internal processes.

In addition, it should be noted that the information requirements, in particular identification of customs, immigration and entry authorities and preliminary financial considerations set out in the Guidelines (sec 2.2) should be more directly integrated into the Assistance Request Report Form.

Each country is expected to ensure that the appropriate mechanisms, protocols are in place to escalate a response and requests for assistance in accordance with their own internal processes.


**EXERCISE: AFTER ACTION REPORT**

**Receipt of request for assistance**
Transmission and Reception of Request: Communications Table Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Fax Time Stamp</th>
<th>Country Fax Time</th>
<th>Phone Time</th>
<th>Email Time</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>8:11:00 AM</td>
<td>8:42:00 AM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>8:36:00 AM</td>
<td>9:23:00 AM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Finland asked if the GOC received a fax confirmation. GOC replied no.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>8:18:00 AM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Emercom</td>
<td>Fax did not go through.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Original fax did not go through. E-mail sent at approximately 8:50am.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Fax did not go through.</td>
<td></td>
<td>9:16:00 AM</td>
<td></td>
<td>Denmark stated that they were not able to receive the fax. An e-mail was sent at approximately 8:46am. The GOC called Denmark at 9:07am, who stated that they received the email.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faroe Island</td>
<td>8:05:00 AM</td>
<td>8:25:00 AM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>8:25:00 AM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9:40:00 AM</td>
<td>A reply was received that a phone number on the fax was not readable (it was unclear what was meant by this message). The U.S. requested that a PDF of the request for assistance be emailed instead. The e-mail sent at approximately 8:41am.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>8:08:00 AM</td>
<td>10:29:00 AM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Fax did not go through.</td>
<td>8:26:00 AM</td>
<td></td>
<td>8:59:00 AM</td>
<td>Issues were encountered attempting to fax the request for assistance. The original fax that was sent was incomplete. A second fax attempt was initiated at 8:27am. The second fax attempt failed. A PDF of the request for assistance was sent at approximately 8:50am.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Each nation was expected to acknowledge receipt of the fax transmission, and those who did, did so within a range of 20 minutes to 1 hour, while in one case almost 2.5 hours had elapsed. Those nations who failed to receive the fax transmission or did not acknowledge it within the hour were subject to the designed secondary e-mail protocol. The secondary protocol was generally completed within 2 hours of the initial request notification. While the tiered and multiple paths of communication are vital to ensuring communication occurs, the success rate of facsimiles sent and clearly received (4/9) sites was not high. Considering the non-participation of two Russian Federation centers, the rate of success remains less than 60%. This result suggests that retaining facsimile as the primary mode of communication requires cyclical (every three to six months) testing of the systems in place.

In was unclear why clearly transmitted facsimiles at 24/7 operations centers were not acknowledged within 30 minutes or less, however establishing a performance measure based solely on a first exercise is also not suggested. A better understanding of the time standards or time required to acknowledge facsimile transmissions in each operations center is recommended. It was suggested that the parties discuss an overall target in the range of 30 minutes per transmission mode. Exhausting all three modes, fax, e-mail and voice should take no longer than 90 minutes to accomplish.

**Processing of request through national competent authorities**

As previously noted in the overall findings, the process in which a request is considered, assessed and made into an offer of assistance is not specified in the guidelines, as it seen as an internal process. The focus of the guidelines is to provide a consistent mechanism to transmit and receive the offer.
Transmission of Offers and Receipt and Acceptance by requesting (host) nation – Results Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Offer of Assistance (Offer Communication)</th>
<th>Receipt of Offer (Receipt Communication)</th>
<th>Acceptance of Offer (Acceptance Communication)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Norway received the Assistance Request Report, but requested further information about the resources. Norway indicated that they were considering the request and it would take longer than the allotted exercise timeline. A formal offer was received on May 29, 2014, at 3:52am Ottawa time.</td>
<td>CCG Exercise control provided a note for GOC action, once the offer was received.</td>
<td>No confirmation from the GOC that they sent an acceptance communication form to Norway.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Various offers of assistance were received from Finland at 10:40am, 10:49am and 10:50am. A fax confirmation received at 11:57am.</td>
<td>Receipt Communication Form was sent to Finland at 11:25am via fax and email. The reply stated that CCG is waiting for others to reply and that a formal response will be provided when all countries provide their information.</td>
<td>Acceptance communication form was emailed and faxed at 2:18pm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>No reply or confirmation received to Assistance Request Report</td>
<td></td>
<td>Acceptance communication form stating that assistance was not required was sent at 2:27pm via fax and e-mail.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Emercom</td>
<td>No reply or confirmation received to Assistance Request Report</td>
<td></td>
<td>Acceptance communication form stating that assistance was not required was sent at 2:27pm via fax and e-mail.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenland/Denmark</td>
<td>An offer of assistance was received from Greenland/Denmark at 12:28pm.</td>
<td>Receipt Communication Form was sent to Denmark at 1:07 pm via email. The reply stated that CCG is waiting for others to reply and that a formal response will be provided when all countries provide their information</td>
<td>Acceptance communication form was emailed and faxed at 2:18pm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faroe Islands/Denmark</td>
<td>No further participation was expected from the Faroe Island representatives.</td>
<td>Not applicable.</td>
<td>Acceptance communication form was emailed and faxed at 2:18pm. For information purposes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## EXERCISE: AFTER ACTION REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Offer of Assistance (Offer Communication)</th>
<th>Receipt of Offer (Receipt Communication)</th>
<th>Acceptance of Offer (Acceptance Communication)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>An offer of assistance was received on May 28, 2014, at approximately 5:30 pm.</td>
<td>CCG Exercise control provided a note for GOC action, once the offer was received.</td>
<td>Acceptance communication form was sent via fax and email to the US on May 28, 2014, at approximately 5:38pm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>An offer of assistance was received at 12:50pm.</td>
<td>Receipt Communication Form was sent to Iceland at 1:07pm via e-mail. The reply stated that CCG is waiting for others to reply and that a formal response will be provided when all countries provide their information</td>
<td>Acceptance communication form was faxed and emailed back to Iceland at approximately 2:00pm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>An offer of assistance was received at 12:40pm.</td>
<td>Receipt Communication Form was sent to Sweden at 1:17pm via e-mail. The reply stated that CCG is waiting for others to reply and that a formal response will be provided when all countries provide their information</td>
<td>Acceptance communication form was faxed and emailed back to Iceland at approximately 2:00pm.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: A final notification that Phase 2 of the Exercise was terminated was sent to all participating nations.

**Offers of Assistance**

A summary of all Offers of Assistance is included in Appendix C: Summary of Results – Request and Offers of Assistance

**Receipt of Offers of Assistance**

As indicted by the table of results the Offers of Assistance were received from participating parties generally within the prescribed formats, however, in all cases various elements of information as indicated by the Guidelines (sec 2.3) were not included.

Specifically:

- In two cases; typed attachments and e-mails were used in lieu of the forms. The first case seemed to be one of simplicity; however, the lack of specific contact and clarification information would have resulted in significant follow-up being required. The second case involved an offer of assistance which included private sector assets.
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• It was also noted that a significant amount of information was couched in technical terms and trade name identification i.e. ROBoom, NOFI EP 350, Lamor HBD, INCONUS VOSS, Harbor buster so it is imperative that such information is clearly understood.

• Only two offers provided some financial information related to the costs associated with the offered assets. While the detailed description of the type of information required is identified in the Guidelines (sec 2.3), the forms do not specifically indicate each element accordingly.

These results suggest that the Offer Communication form be reviewed to provide a closer link between the requirements in the Guidelines (sec 2.3) and the proposed form.

All nations, except for the Russian Federation responded with proposed offers. There seems to have been a miscommunication within the context of the exercise related to the level of participation of 24/7 contact points and assisting agencies within the Russian Federation as the result of recent organizational changes. To avoid any confusion during the exercise, Canada notified the Russian Federation that sufficient assistance was offered from the other nations, effectively releasing the Russian Federation from further detailed participation. Improved and more frequent communication is required during the design and execution phases of exercises to mitigate this type of gap.

It was difficult to draw any conclusions on what constitutes appropriate periods of time to consider a request. In addition, because of time zone differences and the variability of the national processes in place, it is suggested that at least a 24-48 hour period be allowed for. For time sensitive requests, such as countermeasures that have a narrow window of application, dispersants, in-situ burning etcetera, it is recommended that those conditions be clearly indicated at the time of the request.

Acceptance of Offers

Once received, offers of assistance must be evaluated by the requesting nation. Similar to the assessment of the request undertaken by potential assisting nations, an internal process executed by the requesting nation is suggested. For exercise purposes a simplified review was undertaken to only identify those items contained in the offers which would have required further follow-up and clarification. No assessment was undertaken to validate the type or cumulative impact of assistance offered.

For purposes of the exercise and to facilitate discussion on Phase 3, all offers of assistance were accepted in total.
Key Recommendations

2.1 Conduct connectivity tests of facsimile systems every 3-6 months. It is further recommended that the parties discuss an overall target in the range of 30 minutes per transmission mode. Exhausting all three modes, fax, e-mail and voice should take no longer than 90 minutes to accomplish.

2.2 Acknowledge that each country’s operations centers and internal notification procedures vary. Some clearly transmitted facsimiles were not acknowledged within 30 minutes or less, however establishing a performance measure based solely on a first exercise is not suggested.

2.3 Amend the Offer Communication form to provide a closer link between it and the Guidelines (sec 2.3).

2.4 Offers of assistance that include private sector assets, while operationally viable, may be seen as more of a commercial solicitation and potentially better addressed through a contracting protocol.

2.5 It was difficult to draw any conclusions on what constitutes appropriate periods of time to consider a request. In addition, because of time zone differences and the variability of the national processes in place, it is suggested that at least a 24-48 hour period be allowed for. For time sensitive requests, such as countermeasures that have a narrow window of application, (dispersants, in-situ burning etcetera), it is recommended that those timelines of application be clearly indicated at the time of the request.
Background on Escalation of a Response in Canada

In Canada, the Marine Event Response Protocol (MERP) is a multi-agency collaborative approach to emergency management. The protocol is designed to be triggered by events of security, political, economic, social, and environmental or other events of national interest. Typically, this protocol is expected to be initiated before external (international) requests for assistance are considered. Internally the need or request for assistance would be subject to exhausting many if not all domestic resources or to address a situation where domestic resources are not available i.e. specific countermeasure or special situation. As recognised in the Agreement and Guidelines nothing in them is designed to contravene national systems, consequently, in Canada, the MERP is expected to be activated prior to the Agreement. Coordination of various elements of national systems with the Agreement and Guidelines, such as forms, and procedures is encouraged.

Event Review – 19 June, 2014

Phase 3 was conducted in Ottawa, Ontario Canada at Canadian Coast Guard Headquarters. It was conducted as a table top discussion, to review the procedures for entry of goods, services and personnel into Canada. The following agencies (and their roles) were represented.

Canadian Coast Guard (CCG): Exercise host and facilitator, provided the background and summary of the first two phases of the exercise. CCG is one of three identified National Competent Authorities, Assisting authorities and Administrative contact points for purposes of the Agreement and Guidelines.

Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA): To provide the basic background and requirements for entry of goods and personnel into Canada.

Public Safety Canada, Representative of the Government Operations Centre: To provide a summary of the Canadian Marine Event Response Protocol, the process for establishing strategic coordination for the whole of Government response to a significant maritime threats.

National Energy Board: Observer and participant identified as a Canadian National Competency Authority, and Administrative contact point for incidents involving offshore oil platforms and pipelines.

United States Coast Guard: Observer and participant, providing insight into US activities associated with Phase 2 inputs.

The format of the tabletop involved presentations from the CCG, CBSA and Public Safety representatives, followed by a discussion on the implications presented as the output from Phase 2.
Assessment of Exercise Objectives

Phase 3 – Main Objective
To evaluate the legal and procedural requirements to allow foreign resources to enter and operate in Canada as part of the provision of mutual aid.

Overall Findings
Overall, the temporary importation of consumable goods, equipment or service personnel during an emergency event can be accomplished without significant delay provided coordination between the lead department and Canadian Border Services Agency is facilitated. Key elements include:

- Coordination between the Government Operations Centre, Canadian Border Operations Centre and the lead government department or Authority.
- Appropriate arrival documentation and permits, depending upon the nature of the activity, or personnel. I.e. valid identification, admissibility criteria
- For personnel, a letter or correspondence related to origin of the request, name, addresses, contact points and reasons for requiring entry (i.e. responding to a request for assistance) is also recommended.

It should be noted that certain equipment or assets that may contain potential contaminants or are specifically regulated in Canada are also subject to further clearance although not strictly customs activities. The results from Phase 2 indicated that wildlife rehabilitation equipment may be subject to such further clearance and/or inspection. Vessels, in particular, are subject to further clearance by Transport Canada, and Canadian Coast Guard. Countries may wish to create a preliminary list of special response related situations or in the absence of such ensure the proper internal authorities are involved in the process at the earliest stages.

Phase 3 – Sub-Objectives: Summary
At the onset of the design for Phase 3, several sub-objectives were addressed as the result of the overall coordination and advice provided by Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) input, consequently only a general summary was provided. Also as noted in Phase 2, the use of the forms to facilitate the requests and offers was included in the discussion as they relate to the descriptions of the goods entering Canada. While not initially indicated in the sub-objectives, the description of these goods is an important factor in obtaining the appropriate permits and clearance.
The following is a summary of the main comments and inputs, as they related to the Offers of assistance and general discussion.

**Comments and assessment related to Points or Ports of Entry**

Specific items or comments

- More consideration should be given to the logistical process. More specificity on transport and logistics requirement on both sides would focus facilitation of the requests and offers of assistance. Significant logistical issues exist if the request is not specific enough. There will be a need to identify of primary point of entry land, air and sea.

There are numerous points of entry possible in Canada; consequently the selection of any specific entry points will be dependent upon the origin of the assistance, the mode of transportation and the requirement for staging. A brief summary of the options for air delivery includes: 8 military airports and approximately 100+ other airports in addition to 10 specifically designated for commercial entry. There are an additional 200+ marine ports of entry (including the Great Lakes) in addition to 100+ Land based points. The main Arctic or near Arctic locations for both air and marine transport include Tuktoyaktuk, and Inuvik NT (limited marine access) in the western Canadian Arctic and Iqaluit NU, and Goose Bay and St. John’s NFLD in the east.

It was suggested that the lead agency utilise the liaison function described in the Guidelines (sec 5.3) to assist in the selection of the most appropriate points of entry in consultation with CBSA.
Comments related to permitting, approval of the movement of assets and personnel, security and foreign affairs issues. (Specific comments are indicated by bullets)

Legal and procedural requirements, over personnel were not areas of concern once proper clearances have been obtained. Existing emergency services provisions provided for in Canadian regulations can be used to facilitate entry.

CCG as the lead agency needs to explore what other agencies are needed to obtain clearance on commonly available equipment.

While the specific responsibilities and processes of each countries border authorities may differ somewhat, it is recommend that a national contact point, or the liaison role assist, in the facilitation of the movement of goods and personnel.

Specific items or comments

• Specifically an emergency period is considered to be 0-30 days in length, but that timeframe may be extended up to 48 months. For longer periods, GST/HST taxes will be applicable (at reduced levels).
• Of Arctic nations, Russia is only one with Visa requirements. It does not typically take long for visa clearance.
• RCMP and/or CCG can act as the authority to provide provisional clearance, in absence of a CBSA representative, however these entities must coordinate their activities with CBSA in establishing clearance requirements.
• For equipment or assets there are concerns over clearances related to potential contamination (CFIA), and to determine any other specialist agency concerns. For example, communications equipment may require another government department’s clearance and permitting. It should also be noted that the country of manufacture may also be required to ensure proper clearance.
• Notification and some regulatory applications for vessels entering Canadian waters are required by the Canadian Shipping Act, (i.e. application of the Vessel Traffic Services Zones regulations).
• CBSA does not identify all permit requirements for other agencies. Lead Agencies (National Competent Authorities) would need to engage all possible agencies that could have permit insurance/construction standard requirements.
• Personnel under emergency service provisions would/may fall under territorial OSH requirements. They may need a service or labour contract. (Some follow-up may be required to determine application of Canadian Labour Code (CLC) and definition of “employee” under CLC II and territorial legislation).
• Forms were found to be very general in light of the Guidelines (sec 2.3). Equipment, vessels and personnel lacked sufficient detailed information on deployment requirements/logistics. (By the requesting country)
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AFTER ACTION REPORT

Comments on Information provided and other items

• Very little costing data was made available.
• Difference between how parties responded to the questions of transportation requirements: some containerize and expect transport, others will transport. Differences between military or commercial aircraft clearances and or landing locations should be reviewed. (see previous Points of Entry discussion)
• Use of forms not consistent
• Further information on point of contact information requires specificity for use by the assigned liaison officers.
• Potential gap in accommodations. Host parties may wish to investigate significant gaps and resource alternatives. There may be compliance issues with offering certain types of assets?
• Primary resources: government versus private versus military
• CBSA risk assessment is done at the time of the incident in coordination with Government of Canada for what screening needs to be done (eg. Radiation scan)
• Need to consider scaling up early, sometimes in anticipation of a need. Is Requesting Party willing to pay standby costs for something it may not use?
• Looking for exemptions under Coasting Trade Act?

Key Recommendations

3.1 The Agreement and Guidelines are not meant to contravene or by-pass national protocols for response activities. In Canada, the Maritime Event Response Protocol, (MERP) must be followed prior to implementing the Agreement. Coordination of various elements of national systems with the Agreement and Guidelines, such as forms, and procedures is encouraged.

3.2 Each Country may consider creating a list of response related situations that require permissions beyond customs and immigration authorities to ensure the proper internal authorities are involved in the process at the earliest stages.

3.3 Increased specificity on the transportation and logistics requirements is required for both “Requests for” and “Offers of” assistance. Significant follow-up and clarification may impede this effort when requests or offers lack information. It is also important to identify any primary point of entry, (land, air or sea).

3.4 A national contact point or liaison should be assigned to assist in the facilitation of the movement of goods and personnel.
ASSESSMENT OF DESIGN AND CONDUCT

Assessment of Exercise Design and Conduct

The following section provides an overview of the main elements of the exercise design and conduct; it is divided in three areas of interest: Design, Implementation and Evaluation.

Design

As lead or host, Canada through the Canadian Coast Guard employed the National Marine Spill Response Exercise Program (NEP) framework to develop the concept, and ultimately the detailed design surrounding this exercise. It should be recognised that there are a number of different ways in which to design and conduct an exercise; consequently it is recommended that each host select and execute whatever methodology they are most comfortable with.

The design planning component was led and facilitated by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Canadian Coast Guard, one of three national competent authorities identified in the Agreement. The conceptual approach was first vetted in Canada and subsequently presented to the design team in a virtual meeting environment (remote teleconferences, electronic transfer of documents). The concept was presented with a strong emphasis on exercising the initial processes involved in the Agreement and within particular timelines. While this process was well received, each host nation is encouraged to establish the design process and team as early as possible and up to a year or two in advance, to allow for appropriate participation in the process. In some cases, differences in the budgetary planning cycles of the various organizations may limit certain types of interaction such as travel, resource allocation and coordination of other agencies not specifically identified in the Agreement.

Implementation

Implementing Phase 1 of this exercise required the coordination of the ten (10), identified 24/7 operational contact points in real time, using a simulated future date. In addition, those ten operations centres were expected to convey information to the relevant internal National Competent Authorities, which depending upon the incident requires 1, 2 or 3 further notifications. The overall communications network has been summarized graphically in Figure 1. Maximum flexibility and a high degree of commitment are critical success factors in the conduct of such multi-location, multi-phase, multi-time zone, and multi-agency approach to exercising. During an incident the stress levels would only increase the critically of this element. And while the working language of the agreement and processes is English subtle differences in interpretation and utilisation of forms can result. An evaluator/controller was assigned in each country, to facilitate and record their observations.
Implementation of Phase 2, was initiated, and coordinated in a similar manner as Phase 1, however the nature of the activity required more internal interaction aimed at creation of an offer of assistance and transmittal of same. Because no direction on internal processes is required or given by the Agreement or Guidelines, the conduct and timeline of this phase was not predetermined. Consequently, it was incumbent on each country to conduct and potentially evaluate this component as they saw fit. Again and similar to Phase 1 an evaluator/controller was assigned in each country, to facilitate and record their observations.

Phase 3 was implemented as a table top discussion of the primary stakeholders in the execution of the movement of resources from the assisting nations to Canada. The results of Phase 2 were summarized to provide context to the discussion. Of particular note was the availability of a representative of the United States Coast Guard which provided some assistance in clarifying the US input from Phase 2. Three presentations were given to set the stage for the discussion. No specific recommendations related to facilitating tabletop style discussions were suggested.

Evaluation

Evaluators from each nation were provided with an evaluation guideline in addition to the design elements, inputs and scenario background information, by which to control and assist in the evaluation of phases 1 and 2. Phase 3 was evaluated on the basis of discussing the sub-objectives.

The evaluation feedback was somewhat difficult to coordinate given the requirement to execute this remotely. A more frequent schedule of meetings or preparatory activities is suggested.

The final report was drafted and finalised by the Canadian Lead in concert with input from each nation’s evaluator.

As per the Agreement and Guidelines this report is to be shared with the appropriate National Competent Authorities, via the EPPR working Group of the Arctic Council.

Key Recommendations

4.1 There are a number of different ways in which to design and conduct an exercise; consequently it is recommended that each host select and execute whatever methodology they are most comfortable with.

4.2 Each host nation is encouraged to establish the design process and team as early as possible and up to a year or two in advance, to allow for appropriate participation in the process. The evaluation feedback was somewhat difficult to coordinate given the requirement to execute this exercise and evaluation remotely and in phases. A more frequent schedule of meetings or preparatory activities is suggested.
EXERCISE: AFTER ACTION REPORT

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

As the host country, Canada would like to acknowledge all planners, participants, controllers and evaluators. Given the particular format, the participation of these professionals is to be commended for the level of participation, dedication and flexibility executed.

Canada would also like to recognise those entities which participated behind the scene in the development of the scenario:

- **Environment Canada** – Trajectory modelling, MSDS information
- **Canadian Hydrographic Services** – Survey time estimates for uncharted waterways
- **Canadian Coast Guard Operations** – Operations Centre for historical ice estimates, and operational input
APPENDICES

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APPENDIX A –
EXERCISE ORGANIZATION AND PARTICIPATING AGENCIES

Exercise Organization

The proposed exercise organization included the following organizations and roles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Individuals (Organization)</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exercise Owner:</td>
<td>Canadian Coast Guard</td>
<td>• Host nation and lead designer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercise Manager:</td>
<td>Canadian Coast Guard</td>
<td>• Planning and staffing the exercise organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design Team:</td>
<td>Lead: Canadian Coast Guard Support: International Planning Team</td>
<td>• Development of incident Scenario</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Identify challenges and development of the script</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Determining the detailed design parameters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Preparing and distributing communication materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Identifying and securing physical resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Preparing exercise locations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Team:</td>
<td>Lead: Canadian Coast Guard Representative for each Arctic States/Parties</td>
<td>• Initiating, maintaining and terminating play according to the planned scenario and script</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Conducting the exercise so it stays focused on the original objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation Team:</td>
<td>Lead: Canadian Coast Guard Representative from each Arctic State/Parties</td>
<td>• Establish final evaluation criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Selection of evaluation technique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Train evaluation technique, tools etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants:</td>
<td>Phases 1 &amp; 2 Each Arctic States/Parties Operations centre, and relevant national authorities.</td>
<td>• React and conduct activities in accordance with Agreement Guidelines and/or existing national protocols as they are currently practised.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Phase 3, Canadian Customs, Immigration and Foreign Affairs representatives and Observers.</td>
<td>• Participation in facilitated discussion with respect to identifying procedures for entry into Canada.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Control and Evaluation Team Physical Organization

Control Leader - CDN Gov’t Ops Centre

- **Sweden**
  - Coast Guard (Duty Officer)
- **Norway**
  - Center for Emergency Response
- **Iceland**
  - Maritime Alert Center
- **United States**
  - National Response Center
- **Denmark**
  - Joint Arctic Command - Greenland
  - MRCC Torshavnradio - Faroe Islands
- **Russia**
  - Rescue Coordination Center & EMERCOM
- **Finland**
  - Rescue Coordination Center - Turku
EXERCISE: 
AFTER ACTION REPORT

Participating Agencies

CANADA
Canadian Coast Guard
Public Safety Canada (GOC)
Canadian Border Services Agency
National Energy Board

DENMARK
(representing Greenland and the Faroe Islands)
Joint Arctic Command, Greenland
MRCC Torshavnradio, Faroe Islands
The Faroese: Landsverk

FINLAND
Finnish Environment Institute (SYKE)
Rescue Coordination Center, MRCC Turku

ICELAND
Icelandic Coast Guard
Icelandic Coast Guard Operation Center/JRCC
Environment Agency of Iceland
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NORWAY</strong></td>
<td>Kysteverket/Norwegian Coastal Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RUSSIAN FEDERATION</strong></td>
<td>Ministry of Energy, Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SMRCC, State Maritime rescue coordination center of the State Marine Pollution Control, MPCS A, Salvage and Rescue Administration of the Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Emergency Management Center of the EMERCOM of Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SWEDEN</strong></td>
<td>Kustbevakningen HK, Swedish Coast Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNITED STATES</strong></td>
<td>United States Coast Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United States Coast Guard, National Response Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United States, Department of State</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B – PROCESS DESCRIPTION

Requests and Offers of Assistance

The following is a more detailed description of the process required to request and obtain assistance. For specific references refer to the Agreement and Operational guidelines. The main steps in the process include:

1. Request for assistance
2. Assessment of the request
3. Offer of assistance
4. Acceptance of Offers
5. Next Steps – Liaison Officers and Movement of Resources (outside of scope of the exercise)

1. Request for Assistance: (led by requesting nation)

   i) An Assistance Request Report (ARR) Form is generated by National Competent Authority in conjunction with Authorities entitled to request assistance.

   ii) The ARR Form is transmitted by the Requesting Nations 24/7 Operations Center to the 24/7 Operations Centers of the other Nations. Upon receipt of the request the receiving Nations are expected to provide acknowledgment, by amending the ARR Form and transmitting it to the requesting nation.

2. Assessment of Request: (led by assisting nation)

   i) National Competent Authorities and Authorities entitled to render assistance are notified by the 24/7 Operations centers of the assisting nations to begin the assessment of the request.

   ii) Assisting nations may seek clarification on any component of the request; consequently some back and forth transmission of information may be required. Communications between countries should continue at an Ops Center to Ops Center fashion.

3. Offer of Assistance: (led by assisting nation)

   i) The request assessment is completed by the assisting nation, who then generates an Offer Communication (from assisting party to requesting party) Form. The OC form is then transmitted by the assisting nations 24/7 Operations Center to the Requesting nations 24/7 Operations Centre.

   ii) The requesting Nation is then required to acknowledge receipt of the offer through a Receipt Communication (from requesting party to assisting party) Form transmitted via the 24/7 Operations center. National Competent Authorities and Authorities entitled to accept assistance are informed accordingly.

   iii) Note: Multiple offers of assistance may occur simultaneously, consequently requesting nations need to indicate a proposed deadline of accepting or declining the various offers.
4. Acceptance of Offer: (led by requesting nation)
   
   i) This assessment is completed by the requesting nations; National Competent Authority in conjunction with the Authority entitled to accept assistance. The assessment culminates in the creation of an Acceptance Communication (from requesting party to assisting party) Form. The AC form is then transmitted by the requesting nations 24/7 Operations Center to the assisting nations 24/7 Operations Centre. The assisting nations 24/7 operations are expected to contact the appropriate authority to provide assistance in accordance with their internal protocol.

5. Next Steps: Identification of Liaison Officers and Movement of Resources
   
   i) At this point in time the Requesting and Assisting Nations are expected to identify and provide Liaison Officers and to facilitate the movement of identified resources across borders. **Note:** This step is outside the scope of the Phase 2 of the exercise.
EXERCISE:
AFTER ACTION REPORT

Figure 1 – Flow diagram of typical event scenario

Legend – Colour Scheme

- Requesting Party Activity
- Assisting Party Activity
- Guideline Provision
- Activity Outside of Scope
APPENDIX C – SUMMARY OF RESULTS

Request for Assistance

NOTIFICATION / ASSISTANCE REQUEST REPORT

URGENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOTIFICATION/ASSISTANCE REQUEST REPORT – INCIDENT NUMBER/ NAME AND LOCATION:</th>
<th>Exercise Incident #1/ Grounding of M/T LUCKY Simpson Strait East, Nunavut, Canada (68.24.7 N 096 21.7 W)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date/Time: 10 September, 2014/ 0400 (UTC)</td>
<td>PAGES (INCLUDING COVER PAGE): 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From/Country of Emergency: Government Operations Centre, Public Safety Canada</td>
<td>To (Point of Contact): See Distribution List on Cover Sheet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name/Position: XXX, Officer on Watch</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fax/Telephone:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fax XXX+XXXX+XXXX</td>
<td>Fax: See Distribution List on Cover Sheet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tel XXX-XXXX-XXXXX</td>
<td>Email: <a href="mailto:XXX@XXXXXX.XX.XX.XXX">XXX@XXXXXX.XX.XX.XXX</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Email: <a href="mailto:XXX@XXXXXX.XX.XX.XXX">XXX@XXXXXX.XX.XX.XXX</a></td>
<td>Email: See Distribution List on Cover Sheet</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INCIDENT SPECIFICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INCIDENT SPECIFICS:</th>
<th>INFORMATION TO DATE:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TYPE OF INCIDENT:</td>
<td>Grounding of M/T LUCKY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESTIMATED VOLUME RELEASED/BEING RELEASED:</td>
<td>Released: 480 cubic meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Being Released: 2.0 cubic meters per hour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TYPE OF PRODUCT(S):</td>
<td>Vessel is carrying 50,000 cubic meters of Marine Diesel Oil (ISO 8217). Maximum volume at risk in breached tank is 2500 cubic meters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCATION OF INCIDENT (LAT/LONG):</td>
<td>680 28' N 0960 20' W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOURCE? IS SOURCE CONTROLLED?</td>
<td>Source is not controlled. Vessel is secured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPLICATING FACTORS:</td>
<td>Source cannot be controlled however the product is expected to reach hydrostatic balance at approximately half of the available volume. Responsible Party has engaged a response contractor who is currently responding. Response is beyond local capacity, estimated trajectory will impact sensitive shorelines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### EXERCISE:

**AFTER ACTION REPORT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASSET TYPE NEEDED:</th>
<th>SPECIFICS OF ASSET NEEDED:</th>
<th>DATE/LOCATION NEEDED:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Boom/Barriers     | 1. 50,000 metres of 1m deep boom (152,400 ft of 36 in boom)  
                  2. 5,000 metres fire retardant boom and associated equipment for potential in-situ burning operation. | Immediate/On-scene (port of Entry to be determined) |
| Recovery Systems – Sweep system | 3. For MDO fuel type | Immediate/On-scene (port of Entry to be determined) |
| Wildlife rehabilitation Equipment & Expertise | 4. Request for assistance to set up wildlife rehabilitation and provide expertise. | 15 September, Location to be determined |
| Temporary Accommodation | 5. Mobile camp for 50 persons | To be determined |
| Vessels & Crews | 6. Hydrographic support  
                  7. Three ice class tugs  
                  8. Ice breaker for 15 days | Immediate/On-scene (port of entry to be determined) |
| Shoreline Assessment Expertise | 9. 2-3 person crews | 01 October/To be determined |

### ACKNOWLEDGEMENT:

(Name, Organization, Country) acknowledges receipt of the above Notification and confirms its dissemination to appropriate domestic authorities (Date, time).
Summary of Responses to Request for Assistance

The following is a table summary of the response received by Canada.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asset Type Requested</th>
<th>Country Summary: Offers of Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50 000 metres of 1m deep boom (152,400 ft. of 36 in boom)</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 units - NOFI EP 350 (4*25 metres)</td>
<td>17,000 ft. of 45&quot; inflatable Ocean Boom (Party 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 000 metres fire retardant boom, and associated equipment for potential in-situ burning operation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recovery Systems – Sweep system, for MDO Fuel Types</td>
<td>1 Instructor for CB2/4 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wildlife Rehabilitation Equipment and Expertise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary Accommodation: Mobile Camp for 50 Persons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vessel and Crews: a) Hydrographic Support</td>
<td>a) 1 Hydro vessel b) 2 - 250ft Buoy tenders (party 1) c) 2 - Icebreakers (party 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Ice Class Tugs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Ice Breaker for 15 Days</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoreline Assessment Expertise: 2-3 person crews</td>
<td>2 Persons - SCAT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>